Glossary

A $1.776 billion U.S. Department of Justice fund to compensate claimed victims of “Lawfare and/or Weaponization,” announced May 18, 2026.

Not the product of an act of Congress. It traces to the May 2026 settlement in President Donald J. Trump v. Internal Revenue Service (S.D. Fla. No. 1:26-cv-20609) and the Attorney General's implementing order issued the next day. The money sits in the Treasury Judgment Fund. A five-member panel appointed by the Attorney General decides claims; per § VI.B those determinations are unreviewable. The settlement set claims to close in December 2028, but the Fund never opened: a federal court blocked it on May 29, 2026, and on June 2 the administration said it would not move forward.

See also: Judgment Fund (Treasury) · § II.C · § V.C · § V.D · § VI.B · Lawfare / Weaponization

Assistant United States Attorney — a federal prosecutor in a U.S. Attorney's Office.

AUSAs prosecute federal criminal cases on behalf of the United States. The Broadview Six prosecution was handled by AUSAs in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois; AUSAs Skiba and Hogan are named on the dismissal-hearing transcript.

See also: us-attorney

The six people federally indicted October 29, 2025 over an anti-ICE protest at the Broadview, Illinois ICE facility: Michael Rabbitt, Kat Abughazaleh, Andre Martin, Catherine Sharp, Brian Straw, and Joselyn Walsh.

The official court caption is USA v. Rabbitt et al., No. 25 CR 693 (N.D. Ill.). All charges were dismissed with prejudice on May 21, 2026 at a sealed hearing before Hon. April M. Perry, after the District Court identified grand-jury misconduct on in-camera review of the transcripts.

See also: Dismissed with prejudice · Operation Midway Blitz · Grand jury

The lowest felony classification under Illinois law, carrying a sentencing range of one to three years in state prison.

Distinct from federal felony classifications. Referenced on /the-case in connection with Brian Straw's argument, on the dismissal-day livestream, that the alleged conduct by an ICE agent could itself meet the Illinois Class 4 felony standard.

See also: Indictment · Misdemeanor information

A canon of statutory interpretation: when a statute is fairly susceptible to two readings, courts adopt the one that does not raise serious constitutional problems.

On /the-fund, Answer D to the “Democrat” obstacle relies on this canon: reading the Anti-Weaponization Fund's § II.C qualifier to exclude victims based on party would raise serious First Amendment and equal-protection problems, which courts read ambiguous text to avoid.

See also: Last-antecedent rule · Viewpoint discrimination

A doctrine for redirecting unclaimed settlement funds to a purpose that approximates the original intent of the settlement — “as near as possible” to it.

Most familiar from class-action settlements where some funds cannot reach the original claimants. In Keepseagle v. Vilsack the unclaimed remainder of the 2010 settlement was directed cy pres to the Native American Agriculture Fund. The Anti-Weaponization Fund's structure is not a cy pres scheme — see /keepseagle for the comparison.

See also: Keepseagle v. Vilsack

A dismissal that bars the government from refiling the same charges against the same defendants.

The strongest form of dismissal a criminal case can receive. On May 21, 2026, U.S. Attorney Andrew Boutros moved to dismiss every remaining charge against the Broadview Six with prejudice, and Hon. April M. Perry granted the motion. The case can never be refiled. Contrast with dismissed without prejudice, which leaves the door open to recharge.

See also: With prejudice · Without prejudice · Indictment

A federal fee-shifting statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, that lets a prevailing party recover attorneys' fees and costs from the United States in certain civil and administrative matters.

Relevant to the Hyde Amendment alternative on /the-argument: the First Circuit's United States v. Knott, 256 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2001) read the Hyde Amendment to incorporate EAJA § 2412(d)(2)(B)'s eligibility ceilings — including the $2 million net-worth cap for individual claimants and the 500-employee / $7 million cap for entities. The Anti-Weaponization Fund has no analogous cap.

See also: Hyde Amendment

An element of a malicious-prosecution claim — the criminal case must have ended in a way that is not inconsistent with the defendant's innocence.

The Supreme Court relaxed the doctrine in Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022): a malicious-prosecution claimant need only show the prior criminal proceeding ended without a conviction, not an affirmative showing of innocence. The Broadview Six's with-prejudice dismissal supplies the element.

See also: Malicious prosecution · Dismissed with prejudice

The 1946 statute that waives federal sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by federal employees acting in the scope of their employment.

The FTCA's law-enforcement-proviso, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), preserves intentional-tort claims — including malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and abuse of process — against federal investigative and law-enforcement officers. On /the-fund, Claim (a) (malicious prosecution) reaches federal investigators and law-enforcement officers through this proviso.

See also: Section 2680(h) · Malicious prosecution

A panel of citizens convened to decide whether the prosecution has presented enough evidence to charge someone with a federal felony — the Fifth Amendment requires a grand-jury indictment for serious federal crimes.

Grand-jury proceedings are non-adversarial and held in secret. The prosecutor presents evidence and instructs the jurors on the law; the defense has no role. The grand jury votes either a true bill (indictment) or a no true bill. In the Broadview Six case, the first grand-jury session on October 9, 2025 returned a no bill. The same body was brought back across three sessions; on the third, with dissenting jurors absent, the indictment was returned.

See also: No True Bill · Indictment · Prosecutorial vouching

A federal fee-shifting statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A statutory note, that lets a prevailing criminal defendant recover attorneys' fees and costs where the court finds the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.

Enacted 1997. On the May 21, 2026 dismissal-hearing record (transcript p. 40, ll. 15–17) defense counsel for Brian Straw flagged a Hyde Amendment claim as available to the Broadview Six. The standard is demanding — leading appellate decisions read it narrowly (Shaygan, Reyes-Romero, Bunn) — but contested rather than impossible on this record. One threshold question comes before the three prongs: a Hyde claimant must first be a 'prevailing party,' and United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008), holds that a dismissal entered purely to sanction prosecutorial misconduct — rather than as a judgment on the merits — may not confer that status, letting a court deny fees without ever reaching vexatious, frivolous, or bad faith. (Chapman is Ninth Circuit; in the N.D. Ill. it is persuasive, not binding.) The project's answer rests on the Broadview facts — the first-session no-bill, the abandoned felony, and a dismissal with prejudice that extinguished the charge for good. /the-argument walks the threshold and then the prong-by-prong analysis (vexatious, frivolous, bad faith) in the Hyde Explorer interactive.

See also: EAJA (Equal Access to Justice Act) · Anti-Weaponization Fund

A formal grand-jury accusation that a person has committed a crime — required by the Fifth Amendment for federal felony charges.

A true bill returned by a grand jury. On October 29, 2025 a federal grand-jury indictment was unsealed against the Broadview Six, charging felony conspiracy to impede a federal officer and forcibly impeding a federal officer. Contrast with a misdemeanor information, which is filed directly by the prosecutor without grand-jury action.

See also: Grand jury · No True Bill · Misdemeanor information

A permanent, indefinite Treasury appropriation, 31 U.S.C. § 1304, used to pay court judgments and certain administrative settlements against the United States.

Because the Judgment Fund is a perpetual appropriation, DOJ can draw on it without going back to Congress for new money. DOJ Press Release 26-512 names it as the source for the $1.776 billion Anti-Weaponization Fund. The Sessions-era OLC memo (2017) generally barred DOJ from using settlement money to pay non-parties — a constraint the Fund's design works around.

See also: Anti-Weaponization Fund

A 1999 federal class action by Native American farmers and ranchers alleging USDA loan discrimination, settled in 2010 for $760 million plus a cy pres remainder.

DOJ has named Keepseagle as the “legal precedent” for the Anti-Weaponization Fund. PolitiFact rated that precedent claim FALSE. The structural differences are substantial — Keepseagle was a court-supervised class action involving private parties with proved discrimination claims, not a DOJ-administered fund created by settlement to pay third parties for executive-branch conduct. See /keepseagle for the full comparison.

See also: Cy pres · Anti-Weaponization Fund

A canon of statutory interpretation: a qualifying word or phrase modifies only the word or phrase that immediately precedes it, not earlier or later items in a series.

On /the-fund, Answer A to the “Democrat” obstacle invokes this canon: in § II.C's list — “Democrat elected officials, political and career federal employees, contractors, and agents” — the qualifier “Democrat” modifies only “elected officials,” not the later separately enumerated categories. The federal prosecutors and ICE agents who ran the Broadview Six case fall in those later categories, with no party label attached. The canon has limits (see, e.g., series-qualifier counter-canon in Lockhart v. United States), which is why the site presents the four answers as alternative, independently sufficient grounds.

See also: Constitutional avoidance · § II.C

The terms § II.C of the Trump v. IRS settlement uses for the sustained use of government power to target individuals or entities for improper political, personal, or ideological reasons.

“Lawfare” and “Weaponization” function as defined terms in the settlement and the AG order. The Anti-Weaponization Fund compensates claimed victims of conduct fitting these labels. On /the-fund, the four § II.C elements (sustained use of power; covered actor; improper political targeting; improper and unlawful) are applied to the Broadview Six prosecution.

See also: Anti-Weaponization Fund · § II.C

A tort claim against an official who initiated or continued a criminal proceeding without probable cause and for an improper purpose, where the proceeding ended favorably to the defendant.

On /the-fund, Claim (a) is malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court relaxed the favorable-termination element in Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022). The FTCA's § 2680(h) law-enforcement-proviso preserves the claim against federal investigators and law-enforcement officers; absolute prosecutorial immunity (Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)) still shields AUSAs for advocacy-stage conduct.

See also: Favorable termination · FTCA (Federal Tort Claims Act) · Prosecutorial immunity

A charging document filed directly by a federal prosecutor — no grand jury required — to bring misdemeanor charges.

After the felony conspiracy count was abandoned on April 29, 2026, the remaining four Broadview Six defendants were to proceed on a misdemeanor information that, as reported, contained no specific allegations against any of them. The case was dismissed with prejudice three weeks later.

See also: Indictment · Dismissed with prejudice

A grand jury's formal decision that the prosecution has not presented enough evidence to support an indictment.

On October 9, 2025, the first session of the Broadview Six grand jury returned a no true bill. The government did not convene a fresh panel; the U.S. Attorney chose to return to the same grand-jury body. The indictment was eventually obtained on the third session, with dissenting jurors absent. (Transcript p. 32, ll. 1–2 — AUSA Skiba.)

See also: Grand jury · Indictment · Prosecutorial vouching

A named federal immigration-enforcement campaign in the Chicago area, of which the Broadview ICE-facility deployment and the Broadview Six prosecution were strands.

Referenced in WBEZ's October 29, 2025 indictment coverage and on /the-case. The named, organized character of the campaign is one element of the § II.C “sustained use of government power” showing on /the-fund.

See also: § II.C

A defensive doctrine: the Supreme Court suggested in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973), that government conduct could one day be 'so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.' Justice Powell, concurring in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 491–95 (1976), refused to foreclose that due-process bar even for a predisposed defendant — the concurrence the doctrine is usually traced to.

The 'absolutely bar' language is dictum from Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Russell, not a separate concurrence (Powell wrote nothing in Russell). The defense took shape in Justice Powell's Hampton concurrence (joined by Justice Blackmun), which held that 'police overinvolvement in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction' (425 U.S. at 495 n.7). It is rarely successful as a complete defense — most circuits read it narrowly — but it is raised in misconduct-driven dismissal motions, sometimes alongside grand-jury abuse claims like the one available to the Broadview Six.

See also: Grand jury

Absolute immunity that shields prosecutors from civil damages for conduct intimately associated with the judicial phase of a criminal case (Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)).

Absolute prosecutorial immunity covers advocacy-stage conduct — pleadings, presenting evidence at trial, grand-jury presentations. It does not cover investigative or administrative conduct, which receives only qualified immunity (Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993)). On /the-fund, Claim (a) (malicious prosecution) therefore reaches federal investigators and law-enforcement officers, not the AUSAs themselves.

See also: Qualified immunity · Malicious prosecution

Improper conduct in which a prosecutor injects personal opinion, personal belief in a witness's credibility, or extrinsic information into a grand-jury or trial proceeding.

Improper at trial; especially serious before a grand jury, where the prosecutor controls the presentation and the defense has no role. AUSA Skiba conceded on the dismissal-hearing record that the prosecutor's vouching to the grand jurors in the Broadview Six presentation was “at a minimum, arguably misconduct” (transcript p. 31, ll. 10–13). It was one of four grand-jury problems Judge Perry identified on in-camera review.

See also: Grand jury · No True Bill

A judicially created doctrine that shields government officials from civil-damages liability unless they violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Covers most investigative and administrative conduct by federal officers, in contrast to the absolute immunity prosecutors receive for advocacy-stage conduct (Imbler v. Pachtman). The defendant of a § 1983 or Bivens claim raises qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage; “clearly established” is the doctrine's load-bearing — and famously contested — phrase.

See also: Prosecutorial immunity · Malicious prosecution

A First Amendment claim against an official who initiated a criminal prosecution in retaliation for the defendant's protected speech or expressive conduct.

Governed by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), which requires the plaintiff to show absence of probable cause as part of the prima facie case. On /the-fund, Claim (b) is retaliatory prosecution; the No True Bill from the first Broadview Six grand jury is direct evidence on the probable-cause element.

See also: Selective prosecution · No True Bill

The Trump v. IRS settlement's recital paragraph defining “Lawfare” and “Weaponization” — the source of the four-element framework on /the-fund and the “Democrat” qualifier the four answers respond to.

See also: Lawfare / Weaponization · Last-antecedent rule

The Anti-Weaponization Fund's waiver provision — accepting Fund relief means forgoing all other relief, including the right to sue in court.

See also: Anti-Weaponization Fund · § V.C

The Anti-Weaponization Fund's operative eligibility test — a claimant must “assert at least one legal claim” of victimization. The word is assert, not prove. No party limiter.

See also: Anti-Weaponization Fund · § II.C · § V.D

The Anti-Weaponization Fund's seven totality factors that decide how strong a claim is: (a) strength of the claim, (b) the claimant's own actions, (c) actual damages, (d) reasonable attorneys' fees, (e) time in custody, (f) prior relief obtained, and (g) other factors the Fund deems just and appropriate.

Factor (g)'s open-ended discretion is what hands the five-member Fund panel the discretionary weight that, paired with § VI.B's unreviewability, makes the Fund process structurally different from a court proceeding.

See also: Anti-Weaponization Fund · § V.C · § VI.B

The Anti-Weaponization Fund's unreviewability provision — Fund determinations cannot be appealed, arbitrated, or judicially reviewed.

See also: Anti-Weaponization Fund · § V.D

Federal statute criminalizing forcible assault, resistance, opposition, impediment, intimidation, or interference with a federal officer engaged in the performance of official duties.

The substantive count charged against the Broadview Six, confirmed on page 1 of the indictment (docket entry 1) as § 111(a)(1) — the misdemeanor form of the offense. The § 111(b) felony enhancement (deadly weapon or bodily injury) was never charged. After the felony conspiracy count fell, the § 111(a)(1) misdemeanor was carried into a superseding information and then dismissed with prejudice, on the Government's own oral motion, on May 21, 2026.

See also: Section 372 (18 U.S.C.) · Section 2 (18 U.S.C.) · Indictment

Federal aiding-and-abetting statute — it makes someone who helps, commands, or induces a federal crime punishable as a principal. Not a separate offense; a theory of liability attached to the underlying counts.

The third statute on page 1 of the Broadview Six indictment (docket entry 1), charged alongside § 372 and § 111(a)(1). § 2 does not add a distinct crime; it lets the government hold each defendant responsible for the charged conduct as if they had committed it directly.

See also: Section 372 (18 U.S.C.) · Section 111 (18 U.S.C.) · Indictment

The FTCA's law-enforcement-proviso, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), which preserves intentional-tort claims (including malicious prosecution and false imprisonment) against federal investigative and law-enforcement officers.

Without § 2680(h)'s carve-out, the FTCA's general bar on intentional-tort claims would foreclose malicious prosecution against federal officers. The proviso is the doorway through which Claim (a) on /the-fund reaches FBI and ICE personnel.

See also: FTCA (Federal Tort Claims Act) · Malicious prosecution

Federal conspiracy statute covering agreements to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, federal officers from discharging their duties — the felony conspiracy charge (Count One) against the Broadview Six.

Carried a six-year statutory maximum. Confirmed as charged on page 1 of the indictment (docket entry 1), where it appears together with § 111(a)(1) and § 2 — which retires the project's earlier 'confirm against the docket' hedge. Count One, the felony conspiracy count, was dismissed with prejudice on May 7, 2026.

See also: Section 111 (18 U.S.C.) · Section 2 (18 U.S.C.) · Indictment

An equal-protection claim that the government chose to prosecute the defendant for an improper reason, while declining to prosecute similarly situated others.

Governed by United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), which sets a high bar: the claimant must show both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose, and must overcome a presumption of prosecutorial regularity. On /the-fund, Claim (c) is selective prosecution; Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) supplies the First-Amendment-protected-activity doctrinal bridge.

See also: Retaliatory prosecution (First Amendment) · Viewpoint discrimination

A judicial appointee — typically a retired judge or experienced lawyer — assigned by a court to handle a specific, often technical or discovery-intensive task in litigation.

Not used in the Broadview Six prosecution itself, but a recurring feature of grand-jury-misconduct and document-review fights. Included here for general legal literacy.

The Article III requirement that a plaintiff have a concrete, particularized injury fairly traceable to the defendant and redressable by the court.

On /the-fund, Brian Straw's livestream quote frames the standing point directly: a denied Fund claimant has the only thing that builds standing to challenge the Fund's administration. Since § VI.B forecloses appeal of a Fund determination, a denied claim builds the public record on which any later reform fight rests — for a defendant who never filed, that record does not exist.

See also: § VI.B

A short-term court order, typically lasting up to 14 days, preserving the status quo until the court can hold a full hearing on a preliminary injunction.

Referenced on /the-case in connection with Hon. April M. Perry's October 9, 2025 TRO partially blocking the Trump administration's National Guard deployment in Illinois (State of Illinois v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-12174, N.D. Ill.), which found the federal government's “perception of events” around Chicago “simply unreliable.” Three weeks before the Broadview Six indictment was unsealed.

See also: Broadview Six

Government regulation that targets speech based on the speaker's perspective or position on a subject — a particularly disfavored form of content-based discrimination under the First Amendment.

On /the-fund, Answer D argues that reading § II.C's “Democrat” qualifier to exclude victims based on party would be viewpoint discrimination in the operation of a federal compensation program — a constitutional avoidance problem the panel should read the text to escape.

See also: Constitutional avoidance · § II.C

A due-process claim that the government brought (or upgraded) a charge in retaliation for the defendant's lawful exercise of a procedural right — distinct from retaliatory prosecution, which targets protected expression.

Governed by Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), and United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). Often raised when a charge is increased after a defendant insists on trial or files an appeal. Not the primary frame on /the-fund (which leans on retaliatory and selective-prosecution doctrine), but adjacent enough to belong in the glossary.

See also: Retaliatory prosecution (First Amendment) · Selective prosecution

A judicial disposition that finally resolves the matter so it cannot be brought again — applied to dismissals (the government cannot refile) and to judgments (the case is over).

See also: Dismissed with prejudice · Without prejudice

A judicial disposition that resolves the immediate proceeding without barring the same claim from being brought again later.

Distinct from with prejudice. A criminal case dismissed without prejudice leaves the government free to recharge if it chooses. The Broadview Six dismissal was with prejudice, not without — the case can never be refiled.

See also: With prejudice · Dismissed with prejudice